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ABSTRACT: Giorgio Agamben and Ludwig Wittgenstein seem to have very little in common: the 
former is concerned with traditional ontological issues while the latter was interested in logics and 
ordinary language, avoiding metaphysical issues as something we cannot speak about. However, both 
share a crucial notion for their philosophical projects: form of life. In this paper, I try to show that, 
despite their different approaches and goals, form of life is for both a crucial notion for thinking ethics 
and life in-common. Addressing human existence in its constitutive relation to language, this notion 
deconstructs traditional dichotomies like bios and zoé, the cultural and the biological, enabling both 
authors to think of a life which cannot be separated from its forms, recognizing the commonality of 
logos as the specific trait of human existence. Through an analogical reading between both theoretical 
frameworks, I suggest that the notion of form-of-life, elaborated by Wittgenstein to address human 
production of meaning, becomes the key notion in Agamben’s affirmative thinking since it enables us 
to consider the common ontologically in its relation to Human potentialities and to foresee a new, 
common use of the world and ourselves.    
KEYWORDS: Agamben. Wittgenstein. Form-of-Life. Potentialities. Language. Community.
introduction 
[…] every thought can be classified according to the way in which 
it articulates the question of the limits of language […] (AGAMBEN, 
Infancy and History, p. 4).
 
At first sight, Giorgio Agamben and Ludwig Wittgenstein seem to have 
very little in common: the former is concerned with ontological, aesthetic, 
ethical and political issues and is famous for his reflections on biopolitics while 
1 A first draft of this essay was prepared for a Seminar on Language and Politics, taught at Cornell 
University by Jason Frank in 2010. I would like to thank Laura Bazzicalupo, Davide Tarizzo, Ingrid 
Diran, Jason Frank, Bruno Bosteels, Massimo de Carolis and Kevin Attell who generously read and 
commented this paper at that stage.
2 Academic affiliation: Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas — Universidad 
Católica de Santa Fe –– Universidad del Salvador. E-mail: matiaslsaidel@gmail.com 
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the latter was interested in logics and, later, ordinary language, discarding 
most traditional problems of metaphysics. However, both share a notion that 
is crucial for their philosophical projects: form of life. 
In this paper, I will try to show that, despite its ambiguity, form of life 
is for both a crucial notion for thinking the Common, the shared existence 
of human beings in its constitutive and ethical relation to language. Reading 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus together with Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, Agamben 
will try to introduce this concept in his ontological framework, linking it 
to ethics and the question of anthropogenesis. Accordingly, he will preserve 
the ambivalence we find in Wittgenstein between the approach of “natural 
history” and a form of cultural constructivism which, in his view, is able to 
undo the split between the biological and the spiritual, life and its forms, 
nature and culture, in order to think their point of intersection. Agamben’s 
project tries precisely to deactivate a form of biopower which articulates and 
separates these polarities in a relation of exclusive inclusion. 
In what follows, I first comment on the concept of form-of-life in 
Wittgenstein’s time in order to suggest a possible source of its ambivalence 
in its previous uses in the Germanic context. Then, I highlight some 
common features between both authors and comment on some relevant 
Agamben’s references to Wittgenstein. Later, I explore the ethical and political 
implications of the notion in Giorgio Agamben in its opposition to bare life. I 
try to show that this is directly linked to his ontology of inoperativeness, use, 
and profanations. 
Therefore, this article will clearly depart to some extent from 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on ordinary language and will not try to show a 
direct, genealogical link between both authors in the use of this notion. 
Through an analogical reading, it will rather focus on the appropriation of this 
concept by Agamben and its possible uses to think the common in our time.  
Lebensform oder Lebensformen?
The notion of “form of life” appears only a few times in Wittgenstein’s 
published writings.3 However, despite the unclear meaning of the notion 
3 “Form of life” appears as such in Wittgenstein’s published writings only in §19, §23, §241, and in 
p. 174 and p. 226 of the Philosophical Investigations (1953), in §358 of On Certainty (1972), in the 
Remarks on the foundations of mathematics (1956) VII: 47 and Remarks on philosophy of psychology (1980) 
§630 (GARVER, 1994; KISHIK, 2008). Nonetheless it appears many times in his Nachlass notes in 
three different fashions, as: Lebensform, Lebensformen and Form des Lebens. See wittgensteinsource.org
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(HUNTER, 1968), Wittgenstein scholars have agreed from the outset that 
this is the most significant concept in his philosophy (GIER, 1980). Readers 
such as Malcolm (1954) and Cavell (1962) perceived it as crucial, and, at the 
same time opaque, even impenetrable (KISHIK, 2008), since the author did 
not use it in a technical way and did not provide any definition of it.4 At the 
same time, this notion enabled a dialogue between Wittgenstein and a broader 
philosophical, anthropological and political tradition. 
For Wittgenstein, form of life is crucial to understand the way in 
which statements acquire meaning as part of language-games, bringing 
language from the metaphysical realm of logic to its everyday use, and also, 
we may add, de-centering the psychological subject. Separating meaning 
from a subjective intention, Wittgenstein stressed the role of the public use 
of language and its criteria in grasping the meaning(fulness) of propositions. 
For him, the picture of a correspondence between things and words paves the 
way for skepticism, as it is related to the search for a fully logical language 
referring only to states of affairs which is far from the way language works. 
In his Philosophical Investigations (1953) this stance is criticized as a product 
of a misunderstanding of the way we use language which presupposes what 
is in turn to be investigated. In this sense, meaning is related to the different 
language games we play, which are made of both discursive and non-discursive 
practices and are embedded in a form of life.5 But how can we understand this 
concept in the first place? 
This ambiguity of Lebensform(en) can be traced back to its emergence 
in the Germanic realm, acquiring cultural and naturalistic meanings in 
different uses. According to Padilla and Gaffal (2012), the notion appears 
first in the Grimm Brothers dictionary in 1838 addressing “[…] the physical 
condition of heavenly bodies” and “[…] a kind of poetry of mental urge” 
(PADILLA; GAFFAL, 2012, p. 8). Then, in 1905 A. Wechsler (W. Fred) 
wrote Lebensform: Anmerkungen über die Technik des gesellschaftlichen Lebens 
[Form of life: Remarks on the Technique of Societal Life], where Lebensform 
refers to a style of life and describes the regularities of social, everyday life in 
modern societies (PADILLA; GAFFAL, 2012, p. 9).
4 In fact, he hardly ever provides definitions, coherently with his critique of “craving for generality”.  
5 As Garver (1994) points, although many scholars cite it in the plural, in an already culturalist 
interpretation of the term, it only appears once in that way in Philosophical Investigations.  
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Form of life acquires a different meaning in Rudolph Kjellén’s6 Staten 
som livsform (1916) [The State as a Living Form] which stressed the biological 
dimension of the notion,7 pointing that states are not fixed juridical entities 
but dynamic living organisms competing on the international arena. Published 
in German in 1917, it had a great influence in this realm. Indeed, the term 
was appropriated by Haushofer and linked to Ratzel’s notion of Lebensraum, 
influencing later Nazi theory of the state and foreign policy. 
Some years later, Eduard Spranger published Lebensformen: 
Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persönlichkeit (1921) [Forms 
of life: Science-of-the-Spirit Psychology and Ethics of Personality] in which — 
inspired by his Professor Dilthey’s assertion of the autonomy of the sciences of 
the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften)— he tried to elaborate a geisteswissenschaftliche 
psychology in which Dilthey’s concept of Verstehen allows transcending the 
immediate consciousness of the individual’s psyche and grasping mental 
structures as meaningful in cultural relations, while providing objectively valid 
knowledge. Spranger proposed six basic ideal-types of individuality, pointing 
that different human forms of life are determined by dominant commitments 
and activities. Hence, he emphasized the spiritual and psychological dimension 
and the plurality of forms of life. Likewise, the expression appears frequently 
in the Austrian psychotherapist Alfred Adler’s The meaning of Life (1933), to 
describe learning processes in the human psyche during the first years of life 
that shape the person’s mentality (PADILLA; GAFFAL, 2012, p. 10). 
Also in O. Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918-1923), Lebensform 
characterizes a civilization, a psychological and sociocultural context in which 
the individual becomes aware of his situation. Spengler understood cultures as 
relatively closed entities in which people share a world-view. 
Padilla & Gaffal (p. 13) note that there was another book accessible 
for Wittgenstein at Cambridge Library: Hermann Ammann’s volumes 
on human speech. The second volume (1928) is entitled Lebensform und 
Lebensfunktionen der Rede [Form of Life and Vital Functions of Speech]. 
6 Kjellén was a Swedish geographer, political scientist and politician who, inspired by Friedrich Ratzel 
(author of the later ominous concept of Lebensraum), coined the term Geopolitics and also national 
socialism in 1910, well before the emergence of the NSDAP. His ideas are analyzed in R. Esposito’s 
genealogy of biopolitics (2004), together with those of Binding, Hahn, and Dennert, all of which 
theorized about the state in an organicist fashion in the 1920s. For an account of Kjellen’s book, 
unpublished in English, see TUNANDEN (2001).
7 The first German edition of this text appeared in 1917, and had a great impact in this realm.
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According to Ammann, forms of life are expressed through speech acts which 
social character determines the nature of propositions. 
As we can see, this concept was in the air in Wittgenstein’s cultural 
milieu, assuming different meanings. While Kjellén’s notion leads to bio-
political thinking, the other sources seem to enable a cultural one. We may 
add that Oswald Spengler’s ideas imply a mixture of both positions, enabling 
a reading of cultures as social organisms. No wonder, then, that the ambiguity 
we find from the very beginning in the notion of Lebensform will also appear 
in Wittgenstein’s elaborations and will be debated by Wittgenstein scholars.  
Interpreters are divided between those who read it in the singular 
(Hunter; Garver) 8, as form of life, stressing the naturalistic dimension, 
referred to “biological, organic or natural forms of life”, and those who read 
it as “forms of life” (Whittaker) pointing to a cultural approach, implying 
“cultural, social or communal forms of life”. The first view is that of natural 
history, separating different types of animals (CAVELL, 1989; GARVER, 
1994). The second affirms that forms of life are meant to distinguish between 
different kinds of human beings, and they account for our cultural differences. 
“Where the first view focuses on the unity and necessity of the human form 
of life as a given that persists over time, the opposite view emphasizes the 
diversity and contingency of different human forms and the ability to alter 
such conventions” (KISHIK, 2008, p. 121-22).9 
The first stance draws on assertions in which Wittgenstein maintains 
that chatting or recounting are as much a part of our natural history as 
walking or eating, (1958, §415) or that “[…] only those who have mastered 
8 According to Garver, it is likely that Wittgenstein used form of life to refer sometimes to culturally 
variant – rather than biological – patterns of living, but first and foremost Wittgenstein’s forms of life 
are those of natural history: bovine, piscine, canine, reptilian, human, feline, leonine, etc. He also 
maintains that the assumption that Wittgenstein spoke about a plurality of human forms of life is 
unnecessary and misleading.
9 In this sense, Kishik also refers to a divide between “relativism” and “anti-relativism”. Relativists 
(Hilm, Rorty, Emmett) think that “[…] a form of life is a form of culture, and they tend to claim that 
it is inviolable, that it cannot be criticized, and is never superior or inferior to other forms of life”. Anti-
relativists (Lear, Hinman, Rudder-Baker) “[…] tend to see a coherent form of life that goes beyond 
our differences by means of a shared reason or rationality”. He also stresses the opposition between a 
conservative and a liberal point of view. Conservatives take the existing form of life as a solid entity that 
needs to be protected from rapid changes while liberals take the form of life to be a much more fluid 
entity that can and should be mended. Where some resist any attempt to shape a form of life, others 
take the force to shape it to be the essence of politics. While some think it as a-political, others take it 
to be political power par excellence (KISHIK, 2008, p. 122)
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the use of a language” can hope or deceive and that “[…]the phenomena 
of hope are modes of this complicated form of life” (1958, p. 174). From 
this, Garver concludes that when Wittgenstein discusses differences it is not 
among individuals, nations or cultures but among human activities and uses 
of language, and that there is a single form of life common to all humankind 
(1994, p. 267). 
Those who read it as form(s)-of-life, point to the way in which a 
particular context shapes the language-games we are able to play and to the 
plurality of forms of life that exist. From passages like the following, many 
conclude that “forms of life” speaks of a relatively closed linguistic universe, 
such as a “culture”: 
2.41 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?”-It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they 
agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in 
form of life. […] “What has to be accepted, the given, is -so one could 
say- forms of life”. (1958, p. 226).10
Assuming that Wittgenstein was familiar with Spranger’s book —
which, according to Gier sold 28.000 copies—, Janik and Toulmin speak of 
“[…] all the alternative Lebensformen [as] all the possible human styles of 
thought, character and language” (1973, p. 231 apud GARVER, p. 247). On 
the contrary, Garver maintains that “[…] what is at stake in the last three 
passages (1958, §241; p. 174; p. 226), where agreement in form of life is 
invoked as a stopping point of inquiry, are such activities as naming colors, 
measuring, doing mathematics, hoping and grieving” and it “[…] is absurd to 
imagine that any of these characteristically human activities depend on having 
some particular life-style or “form of life” in the sense of Spranger” (p. 247-48)
In our view, the division needn’t be read as an exclusive alternative. 
Indeed, there are also scholars who recognize a first divide between human 
and other forms of life and a plurality of forms of life within humanity 
10 Hardt & Negri maintain that the “emergence of the common… is what has attracted so many 
authors to the epistemological and political possibilities opened by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notions 
of language games and forms of life”. Commenting on the cited passage, they conclude: “First, by 
grounding truth in language and language games he[…] locates it on the fluid, changeable terrain 
of practice[…] Second, after destabilizing truth he restores to it a consistency. Linguistic practice is 
constituent of a truth that is organized in forms of life” (2009, p. 121-122).
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(Gier; O’Connor).11 For instance, Wittgenstein affirms that “[t]he common 
behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret 
an unknown language” (1958, §206). For O’Connor it means that “[w]ide 
cultural variation and divergence from common practice, rather than serving 
as evidence against there being a range of behaviors common to humankind, 
actually shows how much do we have in common” (2008, p. 75). 
As Gier states in a careful reading of Wittgenstein oeuvre, “[…] a 
common biology is a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaningful 
human actions” and “Lebensformen are therefore primarily the formal 
conditions, the patterns in the weave of our lives, that make a meaningful 
world possible”. Following this view, we might read Wittgenstein’s idea that 
“[…] to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (1958, §19), as 
meaning that language is part of an activity and there are multiple possible 
language games within a form of life, which are permanently evolving. 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? […] There are countless kinds 
[…] And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but 
new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into 
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten… Here the 
term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (1958, § 23).
According to Gier, then, form of life has a transcendental function, 
being the condition of possibility of human communication. Similarly, 
Kishik maintains that the problem may not be in the concept itself but in 
the dichotomies that we use to think in philosophy, which do not work here: 
Form of life enables things that seem incongruent to coincide, deactivating 
our dualistic divisions. He also stresses that this concept is at the crossroads of 
early and late Wittgenstein, and between analytic and continental philosophy. 
This interpretation is already an Agambenian one, to which we will turn in 
the next sections.  
11 According to O’Connor (2008, p. 70): “One way to read Wittgenstein’s use of ‘form of life’ is to 
pick out what biologists call a natural kind… There is one human form of life having a natural history 
and is therefore distinct from all other forms of life found in the world. For Wittgenstein, the natural 
history includes not only what might be called biological dimensions, but social and cultural ones as 
well. These dimensions produce incredible diversity within this shared form of life. Wittgenstein links 
forms of life with natural history by comparing the activities and capacities of human and nonhuman 
animals… Wittgenstein is not seeking the criterion that absolutely distinguishes human living from 
other forms of living”. 
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WorLdLy existence, LAnguAge, ethics, community And Form-oF-LiFe 
In our view, both Agamben and Wittgenstein will try to overcome 
traditional dichotomies of Western thought, in order to enable another 
approach to thought, language, world and ethics. Both focus on the 
implications of language-use for human beings. Assuming we are ‘the fly in 
the bottle’ of which Wittgenstein speaks, Agamben maintains that this bottle 
is language and we can only see the world through its glass, but not the glass 
itself (1985). Like Wittgenstein, he also wants to disenthrall us from a picture 
of our language produced by traditional metaphysics that operates through 
dichotomies and also presuppose a negative foundation for language that he 
calls the Voice (1982). However, whereas Wittgenstein dismissed in his last 
writings any metaphysical matter as a product of a misuse of language by 
philosophers, or by misunderstandings due to a certain picture of our language 
that holds us captive12, Agamben will try to think a new ontology. 
From the very beginning of his reflection, Agamben reflects on the 
pure fact of communication and the ethical implications of the very existence 
of language. Instead of analyzing the language games we play, he interrogates 
the relationship between human existence and the existence of language. 
However, Agamben maintains that Wittgenstein had a great influence in his 
own “method” by which “[…] philosophical problems become clearer as we 
ask for the meaning of words” (1999, p. 177).13 In this sense, one of the main 
concerns for Agamben is the meaning of “I speak”. To analyze that matter, 
he delves into the “Ethical” section (6.4) of the Tractatus where Wittgenstein 
maintains that the sense of the world is outside the world, that God does not 
reveal itself in the world, and “the mystical” is not how the world is but that 
there is a world.14
12 In a similar sense, Nietzsche wrote: “Ich fürchte, wir werden Gott nicht los, weil wir noch an 
die Grammatik glauben […]” (1888: §5) [“I fear we do not get rid of God, because we still believe in 
grammar […]” (1888, p. 16)]. 
13 Until his last books on form-of-life (2011) and Oath (2008), Agamben’s quotations of Wittgenstein 
focused on the “first Wittgenstein” to think the relationship between language, world and ethics. Many 
of his references to Wittgenstein are brief and en passant, so we will focus on those relevant for our 
argument. References can be found at least in Agamben (1978, 1982, 1990, 1993, 1996b, 1999, 2011). 
14 In this way, he avoids the transcendent dimension as that of which we cannot speak – and thereof 
we must be silent. Later, as we have seen, in Philosophical Investigations, together with his annulment 
of any possibility of meta-language, Wittgenstein establishes language-games as the main concern 
for philosophy, which leaves everything as it is: its task is therapeutic, it can clarify some deadlocks 
produced by our use of language, but cannot solve them. 
Form(s)-of-Life. Agamben’s Reading of Wittgenstein   Artigos / Articles
Trans/Form/Ação, Marília, v. 37, n. 1, p. 163-186, Jan./Abr., 2014 171
In an addendum to the French version of Infancy and History published 
in 1989, speaking of the project of a book he had not written about voice 
and ethics, Agamben maintains that ethics are possible because of the scission 
between voice and language, because phoné and logos are not necessarily 
articulated as our tradition has always thought. He proposes an experimentum 
linguae by which one can think of the existence of language as such, which 
enables him to envisage a community without presuppositions. “The only 
content of the experimentum is that there is language; we cannot represent 
this, by the dominant model in our culture, as a language” (1978, p. 9). 
Agamben maintains that he takes this experimentum from Wittgenstein’s 
public lecture on Ethics for the Association of ‘the Heretics’ (1929):
And now I shall describe the experience of wonderment before the 
existence of the world, with these words: the world thus is experienced as 
a miracle. I am now tempted to say that the correct expression in language 
for the miracle of the existence of the world, albeit as expressing nothing 
within language, is the existence of language itself.15 
Agamben immediately adds: 
Let us try to follow through Wittgenstein’s experiment, by asking ourselves: 
if the most appropriate expression of wonderment at the existence of the 
world is the existence of language, what then is the correct expression for 
the existence of language? The only possible answer to this question is: 
human life, as ethos, as ethical way. The search for a polis and an oikia 
befitting this void and unpresupposable community is the infantile task of 
future generations (1978, p. 10).
 
As we can see, according to Agamben, language is intimately related to 
our ethos —both habit and dwelling— our human form-of-life, and infancy 
is the transcendental condition of our entrance (or not) into language that 
enables us to think a community with no presuppositions, in which singular 
beings are exposed to the very fact of communicability. At the same time, the 
fact that Wittgenstein referred to metaphysical inquiry as something beyond 
our reach, does not imply he considered it as pure nonsense. For instance, 
in that conference he declared to understand what Heidegger meant when 
15 I use here Agamben’s version, which differs slightly from the original.
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discussing metaphysical notions like Angst [fear, anxiety] and Sein [Being].16 
Wittgenstein maintains that ethical speech runs against the boundaries of 
language (1929), as in the amazement that something like the world or the 
sky exists or in the experience of feeling absolutely safe, where any significant 
denotation fails (also in AGAMBEN, 1993a, p. 70). For Wittgenstein, the 
difficulty emerges when we try to express ethics or this amazement in a 
theoretic or descriptive language in which these expressions make no sense 
(VOLPI, 2006, p. 213-21).  
In this sense, Agamben reads the abovementioned passage of the 
Tractatus maintaining that what Wittgenstein calls “the mystical” is not a 
psychic reality beyond language, but infancy: the only possible non-linguistic 
(and so pre-subjective) experience for human beings as the transcendental 
condition of the acquisition of language. What Agamben is trying to do is to 
turn what has been thought in Cacciari’s reading of Wittgenstein as a negative 
foundation (the mystical, sygetics) as a positive condition of pure potentiality 
he names infancy. At the same time, in this passage we can understand what 
is specifically human for Agamben — and, I think also for Wittgenstein: 
differently from the animal voice (phoné), and from the Aristotelian assertion 
that man is the being that has language, Agamben points out that humans have 
to appropriate their own linguistic essence. The experience of infancy names a 
pure potentiality in which the Homo sapiens can become human or fail to do 
so. It is the unspeakable as the condition of possibility of speaking. By entering 
language, the human animal also enters history. It means that “human nature” 
is already split in its origin. In this sense, following Benveniste, Agamben 
maintains that it is not language in general that marks out the human being 
from the rest of the animals but the split between language and speech, 
semantic and semiotic: 
Animals do not enter language, they are already inside it. Man, instead, by 
having an infancy, by preceding speech, splits this single language and, in 
order to speak, has to constitute himself as the subject of language — he 
has to say I. Thus, if language is truly man’s nature… then man’s nature is 
split at its source […] It is infancy, it is the transcendental experience of 
the difference between language and speech, which first opens the space of 
history. (1978, p. 52).
16 Recollected by Waissman in 1929, the paragraph was first published in 1965 in Philosophical Review 
(LXXIV, pp. 3-27) as an Appendix to his Lecture on Ethics, conference given in the association called 
The Heretics. The reference to Heidegger that opens the paragraph originally entitled Zu Heidegger was 
censored (VOLPI, 2006, p. 214).   
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Although in-fancy (speech’s absence) is not merely a chronological 
stage for Agamben, we find a similar interest in Wittgenstein. In fact, he opens 
his Philosophical Investigations reflecting on the part of Agustine’s Confessions 
(Book I, 1.8.13) that describes the passage from infancy into a first language. 
He analyzes the Augustinian notion of learning a language by ostensive 
definitions, which leads to the misleading idea that meaning is the object 
for which a word stands, which only can be the case in imaginary “primitive 
languages”17 and presupposing that the person already has a language but not 
that one (1958). In this book, Wittgenstein returns many times to the way 
in which a child is trained in the different uses of language or in learning 
mathematics, in a passage from imitation to understanding. Although he does 
not arrive to a strong conclusion on the matter, some implications interests 
us here that will be further developed by Agamben: the idea that infants must 
learn language to enter our human world, that language is the vehicle of 
thought and that it grounds the community through shared meanings.    
Then, both for Agamben’s ontological and for Wittgenstein’s pragmatic 
approach, the acquisition of language is to be made: it is a game we have to 
learn how to play without knowing its rules in advance, but we need to apply 
those implicit rules in order to make our speech and actions meaningful to 
others. For both authors, the Homo sapiens has to acquire language, which in 
turn constitutes it as human. However, for Agamben this subtle gap between 
human beings and language implies that we have the potentiality not to 
become humans or even to fall out of humanity by political interventions, as 
with the Musselmann of the Nazi Lager that loses his capacity to speak and to 
be in the world. That is why in Remnants of Awschwitz Agamben reflects on 
the witness as a threshold between the human and the inhuman, who speaks 
on condition of its own impossibility, showing the specificity of the human 
subject. Reflecting on the ethical character of the witness, he returns to infancy 
to avoid the negative foundation presupposed by metaphysics, affirming that 
“[…] the human being is a speaking being only because it is capable of not 
having language, that is, «because it is capable of its own in-fancy»” (1998, 
p. 146). If this is the case, we might say that infancy is the non-human side 
of the human. But whereas the infant implies a transcendental possibility 
of a mute experience, the Musselman represents the dramatic figure of the 
inhuman within (post)history, the bare life produced by sovereign (bio)power. 
This inhumanity can also be grasped from ‘the primitive language hypothesis’ 
17 Of which Garver (1994) affirms that they are not human languages at all.
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developed by Wittgenstein, showing that human language is not merely a set 
of conditioned reactions to some words —like the Musselman’s reaction to the 
SS orders— but a complex myriad of language-games that are meaningful for 
a specific form of life.
Continuing this analysis of the relation between language, world, ethos 
and (human) existence, Agamben returns once again to the Tractatus in “The 
Irreparable”, the last part of The coming community (1990), as a comment 
to §6.44 of Wittgenstein’s text (“Not how the world is, is the mystical, but 
that it is”) and §9 of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit that issues the analytic of 
Dasein.18 Agamben’s reading of that passage of the Tractatus concludes that 
there is no possible difference between essence and existence and that the 
existence within the world is divine. Together with Heidegger, for whom the 
essence of Dasein lies (liegt) in its existence and its ontological condition is 
that of being-in-the-world,19 Wittgenstein was also making possible to think 
this completely profane condition of the world, in which we ek-sist, which 
means —for Agamben— that the world itself is divine, that the possibility of 
salvation takes place within the world, in its being such, and that the world, 
as irreparably profane, is God.20 Irreparable —Agamben continues— is not 
essence or existence, substance or quality, possible or necessary. It is not a 
modality of being but the being that is its modalities. Is not such, but it is the 
such (1990, p. 77-79). 
This ontological assumption of the coincidence between being and its 
modalities in-the-world is intended to be at the same time an epochal response. 
In the same sense that Wittgenstein was perceived by Pitkin (1972) as a 
philosopher concerned with the ‘modern predicament’ and the ‘death of god’, 
Agamben’s idea that our form-of-life is irreparably profane has to do with the 
need to get rid of theological dispositifs of power over life (AGAMBEN, 1995, 
2007): we must profane them, inventing new uses. While in secularization the 
18 Among the scholars who explored the relationship between Heidegger and Wittgenstein are K-O. 
APEL (1967), Karsten HARRIS (1968), Edward MINAR (2001), Franco VOLPI (2006) and Richard 
RORTY (1993).
19 Agamben (2012) will later deconstruct this notion as part of the ontology of operativeness which 
conflates being and praxis. 
20 Which reminds Spinoza’s TractactusTheologico-Politicus. Similarly to Spinoza, Wittgenstein affirms in 
his Tractatus that the world (i.e. the totality of facts) is everything that is the case and in §5.621 that the 
world and life are one. According to Kishik (2008), completing the notion of Deus sive natura we can see 
life as everything that is the case: Natura sive Vita. Therefore, Wittgenstein would move from the relation 
between language and world to that of language and life, which is crucial in Agamben’s thought.
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power relation implied in the term or practice remains operative, in profanations 
new uses are invented for those institutions. That is the reason why profanation, 
game and use will be key notions for Agamben in his later developments. Notions 
that resemble Wittgenstein’s language-games: not a petrified set of rules we learn 
and apply —like Agamben misinterpreted once (1978, p. 51)—, but a moving 
edifice which is pushed forward by our uses. In a kind of linguistic profanation, 
Wittgenstein brings “[…] words back from their metaphysical to their everyday 
use” (WITTGENSTEIN, 1958, p. 116).
These assertions on the relation between world’s profanity, language 
(as human’s second nature) and life (the Faktizität of existence) help us 
understand what is at stake for both authors in the concept of form-of-life. For 
Wittgenstein, as we saw, it allows to think the specificity of human life and 
the difference among its forms. At the same time, it is crucial to grasp how 
we use language. For Agamben, this notion is opposed to bare life. If bare life 
is the produce of biopolitics until today, form-of-life is the key notion of the 
coming politics. 
AgAmben’s PotentiALities: bAre LiFe And Form-oF-LiFe
As we know, Agamben has thought biopower in its ontological 
condition. Linking it to Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty which essence 
is the state of exception, Agamben conceives biopolitics as an originary 
relation of abandonment by which sovereign power creates bare life through 
the inclusive exclusion of the zoé (biological life) in the polis. In this sense, 
sovereignty is reduced to the relationship between nomos and bare life21 and, 
at the same time, its logic of exception can be traced back to the very birth of 
politics. So, biopower does not relate to a form of life but to the bare life of the 
homo sacer, who, according to the archaic Roman law, one could kill without 
committing homicide or celebrating a sacrifice (1995). In this context, form-
of-life, hyphened to stress the inseparability of life from its form, is the notion 
with which Agamben will try to think new forms of (non)relation between zoé 
and bios in order to think ethics and politics beyond the Law.  
21 Every “political” concept in Agamben has its ontological counterpart. For instance, bare life 
corresponds to ón haplos (pure being) and the sovereign ban is related to the abandonment of Being 
by beings. For this philosopher, ontology and politics are not autonomous realms: in order to think 
politics anew, it is necessary to rethink metaphysics and, within it, potentiality and actuality.
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These thesis on the production of bare life derive from certain 
presuppositions on the relationship between life and language: the way 
in which phoné, common to humans and animals (as zoè), is articulated 
in lógos (bíos) also implies a relation of exception, in which a pair of terms 
is articulated in order to be later severed and sublated by one of them. In 
this sense, if the biopolitical machine of sovereign power separates zoé from 
bios, and the anthropological machine severs phoné from logos, giving birth to 
bare life, a form-of-life is a life that can never be separated from its forms, in 
which it is impossible to isolate a bare life (2000a, p. 3-4). A life in which 
potentiality and impotentiality coincide and language communicates without 
any unspeakable remainder.   
A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which what is 
at stake in its way of living is living itself… It defines a life -human life- 
in which the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply 
facts but always and above all possibilities of life… Each behavior and each 
form of human living is never prescribed by a specific biological vocation, 
nor is it assigned by whatever necessity; instead […] it always retains the 
character of a possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself. That is 
why human beings […] are […] the only beings whose life is irremediably 
and painfully assigned to happiness. But this immediately constitutes the 
form-of-life as political life […] Political power as we know it, on the 
other hand, always founds itself -in the last instance- on the separation of 
a sphere of naked life from the context of the forms of life. (2000a, p. 4).
This long passage condenses many important Agambenian theses and 
stresses the immediate political character of human life, since it is in itself 
related to potentiality and language. Undeniably, Agamben’s ontology and 
its implicit anthropology privileges (im)potentiality. He recovers Aristotle’s 
assertion against the Megarians that potentiality of doing something is also the 
potentiality of not doing it, from which Agamben concludes that a potentiality 
needn’t resolve itself into actuality. To act is to negate the potentiality of not 
doing or being something; so to act can be thought as not not-doing or being 
something (1995, 1st Part, § 3.3). In this sense, rephrasing Wittgenstein’s 
amazement of the existence of the world, Agamben maintains that “[w]hat is 
astonishing is not that something was able to be, but that it was able to not 
not-be”. (1993b, p. 103)
According to Agamben, our form-of-life is characterized by a generic 
mode of potentiality that is not exhausted in the transitus de potentia ad actum 
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(1995, p. 40). The human being is a sabbatical, inoperative animal whose life 
does not coincide with a predetermined form (2007). The human being is a 
political being, not because he has language and thus the notion of justice, 
but because he has no biologically predetermined task and is in search of 
happiness in the community. Happiness would imply the end of the divide 
between life and its form, and thus the end of sovereign power.   
A political life, that is, a life directed toward the idea of happiness and 
cohesive with a form-of-life, is thinkable only starting from… the 
irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty. The question about the possibility 
of a nonstatist politics necessarily takes this form: Is today something like a 
form-of-life, a life for which living itself would be at stake in its own living, 
possible? Is today a life of power available? (2000a, p. 8-9).
In this passage we see the political implications of form-of-life. It rejects 
sovereignty in order to enable the emergence of the coming community for 
which no negative foundation, no identity or subject, can work. A messianic 
community in which the Law is deactivated (katargein) and the exposure of 
whatever singularities should disengage from sovereignty, to affirm co-ek-
sistance as such, with no presuppositions.
Similarly, in Wittgenstein’s writings, community doesn’t mean sharing 
and appertaining as an additional quality to already constituted subjects since 
the link between them is not contractual but one of mutual exposure. Hence, 
once again, the importance of the way in which one learns a language, since it 
shows how one adheres to it as a condition of possibility for a community of 
sense (BORUTTI, 2000). 
Back to Agamben, his notion of form-of-life is characterized by the 
potentiality of thought. Indeed, beyond onto-theology that privileges being-
in-act, thought implies not only specific objects but also pure potentiality, 
since it is not fully consummated in its own execution but rather increases its 
own potentialities while being in act. Thought is a figure of inoperativeness and 
Gelassenheit: it is an act, but not a work, since it does not produce or transform 
any-thing. It lets things be. It is also a means without ends, in which life and its 
form coincide: 
I call thought the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an inseparable 
context as form-of-life. I do not mean by this the individual exercise of an 
organ or of a psychic faculty, but rather an experience, an experimentum that 
has as its object the potential character of life and of human intelligence. “To 
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think does not mean merely to be affected by this or that thing, by this or 
that content of enacted thought, but rather at once to be affected by one’s 
own receptiveness and experience in each and every thing that is thought 
a pure power of thinking” […] Only if I am not always already and solely 
enacted […] only if, in other words, there is thought only then can a form 
of life become, in its own factuess and thingness, form-of-life, in which it is 
never possible to isolate something like naked life. (2000a, p. 9).
Language and thought constitute us as potential beings, they 
characterize our im-potential form-of-life. Whereas biopower isolates life from 
its form, reducing the human being to its biological dimension, the common 
experience of thought enables the re-articulation of phoné and logos, bios and 
zoé, into a form-of-life. Whereas Aristotle distinguishes bios politicos and 
theoretikos and signals the solitude of the latter, Agamben is pointing that bios 
theoretikos is in itself politicos since thought and language are the common and 
take place in-common. At stake here is the Averroist notion of one possible 
intellect common to human beings, Dante’s multitude and the Marxist notion 
of General Intellect22:
The experience of thought that is here in question is always experience of a 
common power. […] Among beings who would always already be enacted, 
who would always already be this or that thing, this or that identity, 
and who would have entirely exhausted their power in these things and 
identities- among such beings there could not be any community but only 
coincidences and factual partitions. We can communicate with others only 
through what in us as much as in others has remained potential, and any 
communication […] is first of all communication not of something in 
common but of communicability itself. […] That is why modern political 
philosophy does not begin with classical thought, which had made of 
contemplation, of the bios theoreticos, a separate and solitary activity… 
but rather only with Averroism, that is, with the thought of the one and 
only possible intellect common to all human beings, and, crucially, with 
Dante’s affirmation in De Monarchia of the inherence of a multitude to the 
very power of thought […] Intellectuality and thought are not a form of 
life among others in which life and social production articulate themselves, 
but they are rather the unitary power that constitutes the multiple forms of life 
as form-of-life. (2000a, p. 9-10)
22 This notion has inspired the theory of Immaterial Labor and the Multitude in authors such as Virno, 
Lazzarato, Negri and Hardt. In this work, Agamben is near to later developments of these authors, 
except for their thinking of constituent power outside sovereignty.
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Although these assertions are far from Wittgenstein’s developments, 
language and thought also frame in his theory the constitution of a community 
of sense. Indeed, Hardt & Negri ponder the importance of Wittgenstein’s 
notions of form of life and language games to rethink the common as a 
shared experience of a multitude of intelligences that do not strive to posit a 
transcendental foundation for sharing:  
Wittgenstein’s concepts manage to evade on one side individual, haphazard 
experience and, on the other, transcendental identities and truths, revealing 
instead, between or beyond them, the common. Language and language 
games, after all, are organizations and expressions of the common, as 
is the notion of a form of life. Wittgensteinian biopolitics moves from 
knowledge through collective practice to life, all on the terrain of the 
common. (2009, p. 121-22).
Far from any relativistic, anthropological and cultural reading of form 
of life as lifestyles, Agamben and Negri are not theorizing the impossibility 
to transcend our culture as a relatively closed entity or affirming the need to 
tolerate diverse ‘ways of life’. That is precisely the logic of sovereign power (and 
liberal multiculturalism), since the state is founded on the recognition and 
representation of diverse identities. On the contrary, the coming community 
thought by Agamben implies the pure exposition the co-incidence of ‘whatever 
singularities’ (a multitude of singularities in Negri’s theory) without identity 
(1990). 
For Agamben, this unitary power of thought and language is 
expropriated by contemporary capitalism in the form of the Spectacle 
(Debord). It expropriates language itself, the human linguistic nature that 
Heraclitus identified as the Common, alienating us from our linguistic being. 
However, that expropriation enables us to experience our linguistic nature as 
such. In this sense, the destruction of traditions and beliefs that the Spectacle 
produces, revealing the pure void of communicability, is the precondition of 
a community without presuppositions and without state.23 (1990: §18) That 
is why the opposition between man and citizen is outdated: citizenship itself, 
juridical personhood, forms of life understood as social identities are all based 
23 This logic is quite Unheimlich when we get to the notion of the Musselmann revealing, in his bare 
life, the true face of the human as a remnant. Many passages in Agamben seem to point that it is 
precisely here, in this pure exposure of a life without any presuppositions, that we find the figure of the 
coming community in its radical opposition to the state and its radical abandonment, as in the case of 
Tiananmen in The Coming Community.
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on the preexistence of bare life (AGAMBEN, 2000a). In this sense, to think a 
form-of-life at the height of the political idea of happiness implies a complete 
rethinking of the foundations of political philosophy and philosophical 
anthropology:
The “happy life” on which political philosophy should be founded thus 
cannot be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition 
so as to turn it into its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity of 
science and of modern biopolitics that everybody today tries in vain 
to sacralize. This “happy life” should be, rather, an absolutely profane 
“sufficient life” that has reached the perfection of its own power and of its 
own communicability - a life over which sovereignty and right no longer 
have any hold. (2000a, p. 114-15).
As we can see, the goal of politics remains leading a happy life, as it 
was for Greek thought, but for Agamben it is only possible beyond Right and 
Sovereignty. For Agamben, sovereign and oikonomical power are secularized 
forms of a theological content, intimately connected to the sacralization of 
life, which implies its inner division and its exposure to a power of death over 
it. Profanation, on the contrary, is a way of deactivating this kind of subjection 
to a transcendent power, freeing singularities from any relation to sovereign 
ban and Law.
In this sense, a form-of-life beyond the Law implies actualizing our 
own manner  (1993b, p. 29) and potentialities. A use of the self (Mills) that 
does not treat existence as a property. An ethics in which being its own way 
of being is the only possibility for happiness. An Ethos, a “use”, which for 
both authors makes possible to think a community of singularities where life 
coincide with its form. 
usus PAuPer And Form-oF-LiFe
As mentioned above, Agamben and Wittgenstein link the notion of 
form-of-life to that of use. Wittgenstein developed his theory of language-
games analyzing the way we use language in everyday life and describing 
formal logic as senseless with regards to this matter. In Agamben, the notion 
of use is crucial to understand his ethical thought. Agamben recovers Paul’s 
notion of chrésis (use) and the Franciscan notion of usus pauper, a form of 
use of the goods necessary to life and a use of our selves outside the relations 
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of property and the Law in general. In fact, developing a genealogy of the 
notion of form-of-life (2011), it is ultimately to the experience of Franciscan 
monasteries that Agamben links these notions, bearing in mind at least two 
points of Wittgenstein’s thought in order to think a new relationship between 
norms and life.
The first reference alludes to the famous reflection on what it means 
to obey a rule. For Wittgenstein, to follow a rule, as a social practice, and to 
believe to be following a rule is not to follow a rule: it is not possible privatim 
(1958, §202). Agamben uses this idea to characterize the relationship between 
norm and life in the monasteries. For Agamben the decisive point is that the 
form of life at stake there is a koinos bios, a common life. To follow a rule 
implies a community and a habit (2011, p. 77). The coenobium appears as a 
form of community of life in which life is the constitutive element, a sort of 
constituent power with respect to any rule.
Accordingly, the second point that the Italian takes from Wittgenstein 
in this book is the analysis of constitutive norms, i.e. norms that do not 
prescribe or regulate a certain act or state of affairs but give place to them. 
Agamben defines a form of life as the ensemble of constitutive rules that defines 
it. Rules are created by the monk’s form of life where norms and life enter a 
zone of indifference that gives place to a third term that the Franciscans will 
call “use” (p. 92). According to Agamben, Wittgenstein’s idea of a constitutive 
rule neutralizes the representation of the rule as the application of a general 
principle to a single case:
The cenobitic project, by shifting the ethical problem from the level of 
the relation between norm and action to that of form of life, seems to call 
into question the very dichotomy of rule and life, universal and particular, 
necessity and liberty, through which we are used to comprehending ethics. 
(2013, p.  72).
   
As we can see, this notion of form-of-life implies an immanent 
relationship between norms and life which opposes the imposition of a 
transcendent Law. As a paradigm that expresses this idea, Agamben considers 
the Franciscan notion of usus pauper and the altissima paupertas as the form of 
life that emerges when all the previous forms of life of the West are exhausted. 
According to Agamben, it was not the rule but life that was at stake for the 
Franciscans. They didn’t intend to offer a new doctrine but a form of life 
(p. 118) which implied a renunciation to property and to Right (abdicatio 
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iuris). A life outside the Law and defined by poverty, by usus, in opposition to 
dominium. However, Agamben points out that since the Franciscans defined 
use in juridical and negative terms —in opposition to property— they have not 
developed a theory of use. This would be the task of the coming philosophy: to 
think use as a form-of-life beyond the Law and the paradigm of operativeness 
that has always been dominant in the West. 
concLuding remArks
In the previous sections, I tried to give an account of the ambiguities 
of the notion of form of life through a brief genealogical reconstruction 
that enables both a naturalistic and a cultural reading of it. I suggested that 
Wittgenstein and Agamben help us overcome that dichotomy putting at stake 
the specificity of the human ‘form of life’ without denying the plurality of 
forms within it. 
In so doing, they illuminate what we have in common as humans: our 
linguistic acquired “nature”, our ability to think, and the fact that we need to 
be in common in order to think and speak. For both, our form-of-life, our 
historical existence, takes place within language. However, we have to enter its 
realm. Hence, infancy becomes crucial for both authors, since it expresses the 
openness of our potentialities, the fact that language, our “nature”, must be 
acquired. In this sense, the greatness of human’s own potentiality is measured 
by the abyss of impotentiality (1999, p. 128).
Indeed, we saw that, according to Agamben, human beings are those 
animals that are capable of their own impotentiality. Far from any biological 
determinism, the human animal, who has language as its specific trait, can 
also be politically reduced to merely biological life, as in the concentration 
camps, revealing the human as an indestructible remnant that can be infinitely 
destroyed (2000b, p. 55). The concentration camp is the space where the 
human, rendered speechless, touches its own inhumanity, and the witness 
must give account of the unspeakable to subjectify himself ethically.  For 
Agamben, “[…] the key difference is between biological life, which lives only 
to maintain itself, and human poetic life, which lives in order to create forms. 
Humans, therefore, should be regarded those beings who may or may not give 
themselves a world” (COLEBROOK, 2008, p. 109). 
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Also Wittgenstein shows that language and therefore any commonality 
becomes impossible when only commands are expressed. At the same time, 
he shows that our relation to language implies thinking our specific form 
of life beyond any biological or cultural determinism. He speaks of natural 
history because the specificity of the human regarding the rest of living beings 
is the capacity to use language, and our capacity to hope or to deceive and 
know to be hoping or deceiving, a certainty that is embedded in our form of 
life as “something animal” (1972, §357 - §359). For Wittgenstein, human 
beings can only become such in relation with others, learning a language and 
communicating through it, sharing a form of life. 
In this sense, while Agamben is interested in the possibility to 
appropriate and expose our own linguistic-being, Wittgenstein thinks the 
conditions of possibility for a language to work and be meaningful for inter-
subjective communication. These conditions are immanent to that same 
language and our uses, to our form of life. 
Last but not least, both authors link our form of life to forms of use. 
While Wittgenstein is concerned with the way we use language-games with 
their rules and the way we learn how to «play» with them, Agamben’s positive 
project focuses on profanations or free use of what was sacred and unattainable, 
foreseeing a moment in which we will play with the Law like kids with old 
objects, rendering the Law inoperative and inventing new uses. 
In this sense, the notion of form-of-life allows both authors to think the 
common beyond traditional dichotomies such as universalism/particularism, 
necessity/accident, bios/zoé, physis/nomos. A form of life related to new uses, 
habits and institutions. 
At first glance, form-of-life cannot be translated easily into politics, 
because it is a key notion for a community that realizes itself through 
inoperativeness (Agamben) and in the use and transmission of language, in 
the reproduction of our ‘complicated form of life’ (Wittgenstein). However, 
Agamben writes in the post-face of the 2001 Italian version of The coming 
community that inoperativeness [inoperosità] and de-creation [decreazione] 
are the paradigm of the coming politics. Inoperativeness means katargein, an 
operation in which the how substitutes the what, in which life without form 
and forms without life coincide in a form-of-life (1990, p. 92-93). 
Then, as we can see, whereas Wittgenstein’s main scope was limited 
to describe and analyze the way we use language, which is embedded in a 
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form of life, Agamben’s notion of form-of-life is a normative one. It calls for 
the interruption of operativeness, an interruption of power dispositifs such 
as the anthropological and governmental machines, through a new use of the 
world and the self in order to enable a life in common in which happiness can 
become once again a political possibility.
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RESUMO: Giorgio Agamben e Ludwig Wittgenstein parecem ter muito pouco em comum: o 
primeiro se ocupa de questões ontológicas tradicionais, enquanto o segundo estava interessado na 
Lógica e na linguagem corrente, evitando os problemas metafísicos como algo de que não podemos 
falar. No entanto, ambos partilham um conceito crucial para seus projetos filosóficos respectivos: 
forma de vida. Este artigo tento mostrar que, apesar de seus diferentes enfoques e objetivos, a noção 
de forma de vida é fundamental no momento de pensar a ética e a vida em-comum. Abordando 
a existência humana em sua relação constitutiva com a língua, essa noção desconstrói dicotomias 
tradicionais como bios e zoe, o cultural e o biológico, permitindo-lhes pensar uma vida que não pode 
ser separada de suas formas, e reconhecendo o caráter comum do logos como o traço específico da 
existência humana. Através de uma leitura analógica entre ambos quadros teóricos, sugiro que a noção 
de forma-de-vida, elaborada por Wittgenstein para abordar a produção humana de significados, torna-
se o conceito-chave do pensamento afirmativo de Agamben, já que nos permite considerar o comum 
ontologicamente em sua relação com as potencialidades humanas e vislumbrar um uso novo e comum 
do mundo e de nós mesmos. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Agamben. Wittgenstein. Forma de vida. Potencial. Língua. Comunidade.
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